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ABSTRACT
The fishery sector has become a large and dynamic contributor to Philippine agriculture. 
However, the sector confronts the problem of high poverty and alarming threats to its resource base. 
Policy responses to these problems have been implemented in recent years, but serious gaps remain. 
Addressing these policy gaps requires reforms that would lead to aquaculture development, bureaucratic 
rationalization and decentralization, the protection of aquatic habitats, the implementation of a 
science-based regime of fisheries management, and the promotion of diversified livelihoods among 
poor fishing communities. A concerted effort to address poverty and resource degradation may incur 
considerable short-run costs, but would likely yield larger long-term social payoffs. 
INTRODUCTION
Philippine fisheries (as broadly defined) 
constitute a significant and growing sector within 
the country’s agriculture. However, fishing 
communities remain among the poorest of the rural 
poor. Degradation of the environment and natural 
resources threatens the livelihoods of millions; 
on the other hand, rising domestic demand and 
increased foreign trade pose opportunities and 
challenges for a sustained expansion of the sector. 
Past development strategies have either overlooked 
fisheries, or have focused narrowly on short-
term production. Fortunately, this neglect is now 
gradually being corrected. From the mid-1980s 
onward, the Philippines has emerged as a pioneer 
in tropical aquaculture and participatory resource 
management. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on 
fisheries development, given its importance in 
food security, livelihood, and the country’s global 
status as a major fish producer. Previous works 
that attempted to do an overall policy assessment 
include Gorrez et al. (1998) and de Jesus, Bondoc, 
and Maghirang (1998). In particular, the coastal and 
marine sector has been the subject of exhaustive 
reviews (e.g., World Bank 2005). However, there 
is as yet no comprehensive, policy-oriented survey 
of the whole sector, covering the gamut of studies 
from the 1990s to the present. This paper intends 
to fill the gap, synthesizing this considerable 
literature to arrive at a sector assessment and a set 
of recommendations.    
OVERVIEW OF PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
As an archipelagic country in the tropics, 
the Philippines has a rich endowment of aquatic 
resources. Its total marine area is 220 million 
hectares (ha), of which 26.6 million ha are coastal 
(compare with the total land area of about 30 million 
ha). The shelf area  (with maximum depth of 200 
meters) is about 18.5 million ha. The country’s 
coastline is one of the longest in the world (17,460 
kilometers). Inland water bodies (excluding 
fishponds) occupy nearly 0.5 million ha, nearly 
half of which is swampland. The fishpond area is 
almost 0.25 million ha, 94% of which is brackish 
water. The coastal population accounts for about 
85% of the country’s total (World Bank 2005). 
The country’s coral reef area, the fourth largest 
in the world, lies at the global center of tropical 
biodiversity (Spalding et al. 2001). 
Fisheries and the economy
Fisheries’ gross value added (GVA) accounts 
for nearly 28% of the GVA of agriculture, fisheries, 
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and forestry (Table 1). The fisheries sector has 
moreover been growing more rapidly than the 
rest of the economy, hitting 8.6% growth in 2004. 
Fisheries are also a major source of agricultural 
employment (Table 2), providing the main 
livelihood for about 1.5 million people. 
As shown in Figure 1, total fisheries production 
reached 3.7 million tons (t) in 2004. Over the past 
three decades, output has grown by an average of 
3.4% per year. Using the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) categories, the largest share 
is still marine capture (56% in 2004). The smallest 
share is provided by inland capture (only 3.7% in 
2004). Official statistics divide total capture into 
commercial and municipal capture (where the 
latter includes inland capture and catch by vessels 
below three gross tons). By 2005, the total capture 
was almost evenly divided between the two official 
Table 1. Gross value added of fisheries, growth rate and share, 1989–2003 (%)
        Shares
  Year  Growth rate
      Agriculture GVA    GDP
	
	 1990	 3.9	 25.1	 4.3
	 1991	 4.0	 25.4	 4.5
	 1992	 1.2	 25.5	 4.5
	 1993	 1.4	 25.1	 4.5
	 1994	 1.1	 24.5	 4.3
	 1995	 3.8	 25.2	 4.3
	 1996	 -0.5	 23.9	 4.0
	 1997	 	 -0.1	 22.9	 3.8
	 1998	 	 0.7	 25.1	 3.9
	 1999	 	 3.0	 24.1	 3.9
	 2000	 	 4.4	 24.1	 3.8
	 2001	 	 5.8	 24.6	 4.0
	 2002	 	 6.5	 25.4	 4.0
	 2003	 	 7.4	 26.5	 4.2
	 2004	 	 8.6	 27.9	 4.2
Source:	National	Statistical	Coordination	Board.
Table 2.  Trade data for fisheries, 1993–2004 (US$ ‘000)
	
        Trade balance
  Year  Total exports
      Fisheries surplus  Agriculture deficit1
	
	 1993	 	 499,511	 404,079	 113,885
	 1994	 	 559,635	 449,298	 430,728
	 1995	 	 545,650	 409,336	 497,444
	 1996	 	 482,309	 340,571	 1,049,327
	 1997	 	 472,464	 335,294	 741,149
	 1998	 	 479,710	 384,012	 1,044,459
	 1999	 	 418,844	 294,956	 1,287,408
	 2000	 	 449,376	 337,780	 1,034,543
	 2001	 	 414,430	 343,068	 985,276
	 2002	 	 453,030	 360,506	 1,134,792
	 2003	 	 464,463	 378,058	 938,419
	 2004	 	 454,384	 380,492	 1,081,249
Source:	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	(2005,	2006).	
1Crops	and	livestock	products,	excluding	live	animals.
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categories (though in the early 1990s the share of 
municipal capture was almost 60%). 
Aquaculture, which was initially comparable 
in size to that of inland capture in the 1970s, has 
grown rapidly to become a major contributor to 
fish production. This sub-sector has been averaging 
8.7% annual growth over the last 30 years, compared 
to only 2.0% growth for marine capture. Currently, 
the bulk of output (about 60%) originates from the 
culture of Euchemia seaweed. 
Exports in 2004 reached US$ 454 million, 
accounting for over one-fifth of all agricultural 
exports (Table 3). From 1990 to 2003 fisheries 
exports expanded by 17% (in nominal US$). 
Fisheries trade balance has been positive, in sharp 
contrast with the rest of agriculture. Since 2003, 
the biggest fisheries export (in value) has been 
tuna, replacing shrimps and prawn. Consistently 
at third place is seaweed. In terms of imports, tuna 
is the leading fishery product, recently displacing 
fishmeal. Other major imports are the raw materials 
for the canning industry, such as mackerel and 
sardines. 
Fisheries and households
Fisheries are a significant source of food and 
livelihood. Data from the FAO fishery statistics 
estimate a per capita fish consumption of 28.8 
kilograms per year (kg/yr), much higher than 
the global per capita consumption of 15.1 kg/yr; 
figures also show that about 38% of animal protein 
intake is from fish. However, Dey et al. (2005a), 
using primary data, argue that for some countries 
like the Philippines, the FAO data are severely 
underestimated. Moreover, national averages 
conceal the importance of fish in the diet of the 
poor; data show that the lowest quartile’s share 
of fish in animal protein intake is much higher 
than the top quartile’s. Likewise, de Jesus and 
Almazan (2002) find that a food consumption 
survey estimates per capita consumption of fish at 
about 36 kg/yr in 1993, compared to only 24 kg/yr 
estimated from fisheries statistics data. 
The poverty profile by basic sectors computed 
by the National Statistics Coordination Board 
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Source:	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	(2005).
Fig. 1.  Fisheries output by production category (tons), 1974–2004
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fisheries workers is higher than total poverty, 
or even poverty among farmers (Table 4). With 
few exceptions, poverty among fisheries workers 
is higher than regional poverty, particularly in 
the poorest regions.  Finally, regions accounting 
for greater shares of the fishery population also 
have very high rates of poverty among fisheries 
workers.  
Not only are fishery-dependent households 
poor, they are also highly vulnerable. Fishing is 
one of the most dangerous of occupations; fish 
yield (whether from capture or aquaculture) is 
Table 3. Export and import shares of fish products (%)
    2000  2001  2002  2003
Export shares (values)	 	 	 	
				Tuna	 23.7	 25.1	 27.5	 29.2
				Seaweeds	 16.8	 15.6	 14.4	 15.4
				Octopus	 4.8	 6.3	 6.4	 7.0
				Crab	 3.8	 6.7	 5.9	 6.2
				Live	grouper	 2.7	 2.5	 2.1	 1.7
				Others	 19.7	 16.4	 15.9	 16.4
Import shares (values)	 	 	 	
				Fish	meal	 30.9	 41.5	 34.0	 25.9
				Tuna	 18.6	 11.6	 17.8	 39.4
				Mackerel	 13.7	 9.3	 8.3	 6.5
				Sardines	 12.6	 7.9	 17.2	 2.9
    Squid and cuttlefish  8.7  7.9  5.2  3.4
				Others	 15.5	 21.8	 17.6	 21.8
Source:	Bureau	of	Agricultural	Statistics.		
Table 4. Poverty Incidence by region, all sectors and fisheries sector (%)
	
         Fisheries
    Region  All sectors
       Poverty  Region’s population 
         share
	 National	Capital	 7.6	 27.9	 1.7
	 Ilocos	 35.1	 57.4	 5.0
	 Northern	Luzon	 30.4	 24.2	 1.2
	 Central	Luzon	 21.4	 27.0	 4.8
	 Southern	Tagalog		 19.1	 33.4	 6.1
	 MIMAROPA	 45.2	 54.8	 7.2
	 Bicol	 52.6	 57.1	 12.0
	 Western	Visayas	 44.4	 60.9	 9.6
	 Central	Visayas	 36.2	 43.9	 9.2
	 Eastern	Visayas	 45.1	 36.1	 7.8
	 Zamboanga	Peninsula	 44.8	 53.4	 2.9
	 Northern	Mindanao	 43.8	 53.6	 4.1
	 Davao	 33.1	 43.6	 5.7
	 SOCCSKSARGEN	 46.8	 47.4	 3.3
	 CAR	 37.6	 -	 0.1	
	 ARMM	 59.8	 66.6	 14.8
	 Caraga	 50.9	 59.9	 4.5
	 Philippines	 33.0	 50.8	 100.0
Source:	National	Statistical	Coordination	Board	(2005).
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unpredictable due to local conditions and climate 
fluctuations. Nevertheless, among rural households 
with access to the sea or water bodies, fishing is a 
household strategy to maintain subsistence as well 
as cope with shocks (McFadyen and Corcoran 
2002). 
Trends in resource degradation
Favorable production trends mask the alarming 
deterioration in the country’s aquatic resources. 
By the 1990s, demersal marine biomass in major 
fishing areas had fallen by a range of  65% to 90%, 
compared to their baseline levels in the 1940s to 
1970s (Silvestre et al. 2003). A large part of the 
stock decline is attributed to overfishing. The 
commercial fleet expanded rapidly in the 1960s 
and 1970s, although it has contracted since then 
(Trinidad 2003). Fishing effort has also been 
increasing in the municipal fisheries, based on data 
available for small pelagic fishes up to 1985. Catch 
per unit effort or CPUE (in t/horsepower/year) fell 
from 2.5 to 0.84 for the capture of small pelagic 
fishes from 1965 to 1985 (Dalzell et al. 1987). 
Since then, employment in fisheries, mostly in 
the municipal sub-sector, has risen, indicating a 
continuation of this trend. The average catch of a 
municipal fisher is now probably only 30% of 1991 
levels (World Bank 2005). Meanwhile, in regard to 
demersal capture, CPUE fell from 1.13 to 0.42 from 
1965 to 1985 (Silvestre and Pauly 1987). 
Stock assessment and bioeconomic studies 
confirm the hypothesis of overfishing and the 
consequent rent dissipation. Dalzell et al. (1987) 
compute a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of 
544,000 t for small pelagic fishes, an output level 
reached back in 1975. Foregone economic rent is 
estimated at US$500 million/yr (Trinidad et al. 
1993). Similar figures for MSY are obtained for 
the same fishery by Padilla and de Guzman (1994), 
with foregone rent computed at about 7 billion 
pesos. On the other hand, for demersal capture the 
MSY is computed at 340,000 t, an output level 
that was reached in the 1970s (Silvestre and Pauly 
1987). Israel and Banzon (1998) computed an 
MSY of 786,000 t for commercial fisheries, which 
was attained in the early 1990s. The maximum 
economic yield is 674,000 t, implying that a 45% 
effort reduction is required to maximize economic 
rent. 
The destruction of habitats is another major 
threat to aquatic resources. In the 1980s, 33% of 
coral reefs were rated as being in ‘poor’ condition, 
rising to nearly 40% in the 2000s (Tun et al. 2004). 
Aside from overfishing and destructive practices 
(such as blast and poison fishery), other sources 
of damage are sedimentation and dive tourism. 
Mangroves are also in a precarious state. Of an 
estimated 450,000 ha of mangrove forest in 1918, 
only 31% is currently standing. The biggest source 
of mangrove destruction is the conversion to 
fishponds, accounting for over half of the loss; this 
is followed by the harvesting of mangrove forests 
for fuel wood (White and de Leon 2004). 
Pollution compounds the aforementioned 
problems. Domestic and industrial wastes, 
agrochemical loading, siltation/sedimentation, 
toxic wastes (from mine tailings), and oil pollution 
have affected several bays (McGlone et al. 2004). 
Increasing urbanization appears to be closely linked 
to rising pollution levels (de Guzman and Dumayas 
1998). Even inland fisheries are not spared, as 
they are endangered by terrestrial activities and 
alternative water uses (Juliano 1999). 
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Historical background
Traditionally, virtually all fish production was 
marine fishing, for which the community fishing 
rights were in place at the barangay (village) level. 
Under the colonial period, municipalities largely 
supplanted barangays as the administrative unit; 
however, the absence of management led to a de 
facto open access (Lopez 1985). Commercialization 
of fisheries began in the twentieth century; by 
the 1970s policies began to favor increasing 
production, as commercial capture was classified 
as an investment priority (Trinidad 2003). Up to the 
mid-1980s, government also promoted municipal 
fisheries production alongside aquaculture. 
By  the  1980s,  the  consequences  of  a 
productivity-oriented thrust became apparent. 
Overfishing led to lower returns per unit effort, 
squeezing dry the profitability of fishing as a 
livelihood. Moreover, conflicts of resource access 
and use were heightened by the inducement for 
large-scale exploitation of aquatic resources. In 
commercial capture, investment incentives led 
briones_final.indd   29 8/24/2007   10:01:52 AM30 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
to the entry of large fishing boats with greater 
fishing power, extracting stocks in both inshore 
and offshore waters. In aquaculture, fishpond leases 
tended to fall into the hands of wealthy investors, as 
the majority of small-scale fishers lacked the funds 
and the know-how for brackish-water aquaculture 
(such as for prawn raising), nor had they the 
political connections to facilitate the acquisition 
of leases and permits (World Bank 2004). Cage 
aquaculture in lakes also restricted open-water 
fishing for municipal fishers. These inequities 
eventually galvanized the fisherfolks and civil 
society to advocate grassroots empowerment. 
Legislative framework
Currently the legislative framework for 
fisheries is mostly contained in the Fisheries Code 
of 1998, the Local Government Code of 1991, and 
the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act 
(AFMA) of 1997. The AFMA introduced reforms in 
the agriculture sector as a whole (such as in the areas 
of credit and extension). The Local Government 
Code meanwhile places resource management, 
including coastal and inland fisheries, under the 
jurisdiction of local government units (LGU). It 
also devolves to LGUs the provision of aquaculture 
support services (along with general agricultural 
support services), and the operation of fish ports. 
Under the Fisheries Code, municipal waters 
consist of both inland waters as well as marine 
waters up to 15 km from the shore. The 0–10 
km zone is exclusively reserved for municipal 
fishers. The Code also assigns to LGUs the task 
of identifying the fisher organizations which may 
gain the sole use of demarcated areas for capture or 
mariculture. It authorizes the creation of Integrated 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management 
Councils (IFARMC) to cover bays, gulfs, and water 
bodies bounded by two or more municipalities, thus 
addressing the issue of shared stocks and habitats. 
Commercial waters, meanwhile, are placed under 
the Department of Agriculture (DA), the lead 
agency for fisheries development. Within the DA, 
fisheries functions are handled by the Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resource (BFAR), which 
was reorganized as a line bureau with its own 
regional units. 
Under the Code, fisheries management may 
take the form of licensing, gear restrictions, open 
and closed seasons, catch ceilings, fish sanctuaries, 
and other instruments. Harvest is to be kept at levels 
consistent with MSY, to be determined according to 
the best available scientific information. Commercial 
fishery production is provided incentives towards 
offshore fishing, such as duty-free importation of 
fishing vessels, and tax rebates on fuel.
For aquaculture, the Code assigns to the DA 
the responsibility for the leasing of public lands 
to be used as fishponds. Priority lessees would 
be the fisher cooperatives. Lease rates are to be 
determined by the DA at levels consistent with 
resource rents. Leases are to last for 25 years, and 
are subject to renewal; lease income is supposed to 
accrue to national aquaculture research institutes. 
For marketing and foreign trade, the Code restricts 
fish importation, except for raw materials for the 
canning industry; the restriction can only be lifted 
with prior certification from the DA. Imports and 
exports are regulated under a permit system, while 
exports of fry, eggs, brood stock, and captured live 
fish are prohibited. The Code also provides for 
designation of various credit support funds as well 
as the reorganization of the R & D system. 
Programs
Fisheries development is primarily implemented 
through the GMA–Fisheries program which is 
administered by the BFAR. Program components 
include rural finance, fisheries production, fisheries 
training and extension services, fisheries information 
and marketing support, research and development, 
fisheries infrastructure, and fisheries management. 
The management component aims to promote 
community-based coastal resource management, 
particularly at the bay level. It also seeks to establish 
marine protected areas (MPAs) as well as strictly 
enforce fishery laws and regulations. 
Other agencies and bodies have functions 
closely related to fisheries, reflecting the multiple-
use nature of aquatic resources, as well as the 
diverse government structures created in response to 
these multiple needs. Coastal resource management 
falls under the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR). For municipal waters, 
a number of LGUs undertake their own coastal 
and fisheries programs, often with the support of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well 
as donor funding. The other government agencies 
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involved are: the Maritime Authority and Coast 
Guard; the Philippine National Police, and the 
Armed Forces. 
Within each agency, there may also be 
specialized offices for specific tasks. For instance, 
within the DA, the Philippine Fisheries Development 
Authority (PFDA) is in charge of fishing ports. 
Within the DENR, there is the Protected Areas and 
Wildlife Board (PAWB) to take charge of national 
reserves, the Environment and Management Bureau 
(EMB) to handle pollution and water quality, 
the Water Board to assign rights to inland water 
bodies and groundwater, and the Laguna Lake 
Development Authority (LLDA) to manage Laguna 
Lake. 
ASSESSMENT OF POLICIES 
AND PROGRAMS
Framework for assessment
In Figure 2 we illustrate a simple framework for 
assessing the contributions of programs and policies 
to the well-being of fish-dependent households. The 
two aspects of well-being are food consumption 
and livelihoods. Contributing to these are fisheries-
related activities, related overall to value creation 
(that is, production, processing, and marketing). 
Other economic activities (under the rubric of 
diversification) offer alternative means of obtaining 
food and livelihood. Note that these two types of 
activities are intertwined: the diversification of 
livelihoods of fishers may reduce fishing pressure 
and protect the flow of fish catch; conversely, 
increasing the value creation of fisheries may permit 
some fishers to diversify their livelihood and food 
consumption. 
Factors affecting the way economic activities are 
conducted are institutional arrangements and other 
policies and programs. Institutional arrangements 
are especially crucial for the management of natural 
resources. For capture fisheries, the open-access 
policy explains the overexploitation of renewable 
resources (including fish stocks) and the dissipation 
of economic rent. 
“Other policies and programs” is a catchall for 
diverse measures such as credit provision, livelihood 
assistance, research and development, extension, 
Fig. 2.  Conceptual framework
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infrastructure provision, and various market and 
trade interventions (tariffs, taxes, product standards, 
subsidies, and so on). The framework indicates 
that policies related to institutional arrangements 
and resource management specific to fisheries, be 
considered separately from other policies, which 
share features common to other types of economic 
activities promoted or restrained by government 
intervention. 
The new institutional arrangements 
for managing resources
The trend in natural resource management is 
the adoption of community-based, collaborative 
approaches  involving  national  and  local 
governments, as well as fishing communities 
and NGOs. These arrangements fall in between 
individual rights-based arrangements, such as 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), and state-
administered command-and-control. Experience 
in both developed and developing country fisheries 
has exposed severe flaws in command-and-control 
(Clark 2006). Neither are ITQs appropriate within 
the setting of tropical fisheries, which are often 
small-scale and multi-species (Squires et al. 
2003). Collaborative management avoids these 
disadvantages and is winning increasing acceptance 
among governments, development agencies, and 
researchers (Nielsen et al. 2004). 
In the Philippines, virtually all collaborative 
management projects are found in coastal areas. 
The most typical elements of community-based 
coastal management projects are: community 
organization, establishment of marine protected 
areas, enforcement of fishery laws, gear restrictions, 
rehabilitation of aquatic habitats, and livelihood 
generation. 
These projects have at times scored tangible 
successes. Increases in fish catch have been 
observed, for example, in the Central Visayas 
Regional Project or CVRP (de los Angeles 
1994), and the Marine Conservation Project of 
San Salvador (Katon et al. 1997). The Coastal 
Resource Management Project  (CRMP) estimates 
that around its marine sanctuaries, fish stocks have 
tripled after nine years (CRMP 2004). Management 
of mangroves and solid wastes, protection of 
marine sanctuaries, enforcement of fishing laws, 
and protection of marine sanctuaries were cited 
as the most successful elements of the CRMP. 
This is virtually identical to the list of successful 
components identified in San Salvador, and the 
CVRP. 
Collaborative approaches do have their share 
of problems. First is the lack of sustainability. 
Pomeroy and Carlos (1997) note that among 47 
community-based projects in 1984-1994, only 
nine continued after project completion. Many of 
these coastal resource management programs are 
initiated by, and end with the donor funding. One 
explanation is that community-based institutions are 
plagued by transaction costs and free rider problems, 
which may well undermine the durability of these 
organizations (Mustapha et al. 1998). One estimate 
places the share of transaction cost in total project 
cost to be as high as 37% (Sumalde 2004). Lack 
of sustainability could also be traced to the weak 
capacity of LGUs. The second problem arising from 
collaborative approaches is the lack of program 
replication. Again, weak LGU capacity in terms of 
human resources and administrative infrastructure 
constrains the spread of co-management approaches 
(World Bank 2004). Furthermore, the concept of 
co-management may not be welcome among some 
municipalities prone to elite capture.
Systems and implementation 
of fisheries management
Institutional weaknesses also plague fisheries 
management at the national level.  The plethora of 
agencies and bodies with fisheries-related functions 
leads to jurisdictional overlaps, duplication of effort, 
lack of accountability, or outright contradictions 
in policies and programs. Dynamics within the 
bureaucracy further exacerbates the confusion, 
as new offices are created, or the functions of 
existing offices are frequently modified, weakening 
institutional memory and capacity (La Viña 
2002). 
Another serious oversight is the persistence 
of implementation gaps. The Fisheries Code, for 
example, mandates technical guidelines, such as 
the extraction of resource rents, and fishing at 
levels consistent with MSY. These guidelines are 
not enforced. For instance, the pricing of resources 
by the DA falls way below levels consistent with 
resource rents. This holds for both fishpond leases 
(White and de Leon 2004) and commercial vessels; 
briones_final.indd   32 8/24/2007   10:01:52 AM33 Roehlano M. Briones
neither are the latter monitored for compliance 
with the principles of responsible fishing (World 
Bank 2005). 
The control of fishing efforts to keep them at 
levels consistent with MSY is virtually absent. In 
the first place, reference points (such as MSY) have 
yet to be defined. The rich information collected by 
the National Stock Assessment Program remains 
underutilized for the purpose of setting reference 
points and monitoring fish stocks. 
At the LGU level, there are a few instances of 
fisheries management measures. General Santos 
City, for example, imposes size restrictions on 
tuna fishery to avoid recruitment overfishing. 
Zamboanga City implements open and closed 
seasons within its coastal waters. On the whole, 
however, the lacuna in fisheries management is 
quite obvious for most municipalities and cities. 
The systematic administration of municipal waters 
presupposes a formalized system of registered 
users. However, municipalities have largely failed 
to formalize the municipal fisheries system, again 
due to weak capacity and the sheer magnitude of 
the informal sector to be regulated. Campos et al. 
(2003) for instance find that 84% of municipal 
fishers in Lamon Bay operate without a license. 
Furthermore, where licensing is implemented (as 
in Sarangani Bay), fees are merely seen as a means 
to generate income and not as a tool for fisheries 
management or generating economic rent (Elazegui 
et al. 1998). 
Interestingly, management gaps persist even 
for the much-touted co-management schemes. It 
is fair to say that effort reduction is not an explicit 
objective even in community-based approaches. 
One gains the impression that such projects have 
focused almost exclusively on the rehabilitation of 
reefs and mangroves, combined with MPAs and the 
elimination of illegal fishing, to improve fish stocks. 
These measures are certainly beneficial, though 
whether they are sufficient is another matter. Bundy 
and Pauly (2001), in a study of San Miguel Bay, 
demonstrate that municipal fishers contribute more 
to the reduction of fish abundance than commercial 
trawlers. 
Penalba et al. (1994), using regression analysis, 
notes the ambiguous effect of the CVRP on fishing 
effort: while greater community involvement in 
coastal resource management tends to be associated 
with lower fishing effort, the infrastructure and 
technology interventions of the CVRP led to 
higher fishing effort (for example, better roads may 
improve access to fishing grounds). De Guzman 
(2004), in another study of Danao Bay, points out 
that the catch per unit effort and profitability remain 
low, despite the presence of an MPA. In fact, Danao 
Bay remains essentially an open-access fishery, 
without curbs on fishing effort.
VALUE CREATION PROGRAMS
One of the strengths of the fisheries value chain 
is an open and competitive marketing environment 
(despite popular belief to the contrary). A 2005 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) study on the 
domestic freshwater fish market found that in 
1997-2001, real marketing margins fell 7% annually 
as free entry forced inefficient traders out of the 
market. Farmers could expect to receive no less 
than 50% of the retail price. This market structure 
characterization probably holds for most domestic 
fish markets in the country. 
For foreign trade, the restrictions imposed by 
the Fisheries Code on imports and exports appear 
stringent, on paper. However, calculations of the 
effective protection rate (almost identical to the 
nominal protection rate) arrive at low estimates of 
protection, around 4.3% in 2004, down slightly from 
6.3% in 1999. Tariff protection on fish products is 
also low; in 2004, rates for fish ranged from 1% to 
15%, averaging 6.9%; the rates for processed fish 
were 3% to 15%, averaging 9.8% (World Trade 
Organization 2005). Domestic markets are therefore 
fairly open to international trade, though concerns 
remain about tariff escalation, as well as the 
continuing penalization—dating back from the late 
1990s— experienced by sub-sectors such as tuna, 
seaweed, and milkfish (Gonzales et al. 1998). 
Problems begin to be observed as we move 
back up the supply chain. The list of problems 
henceforth resembles those besetting agriculture, 
as a whole. In the post-harvest stage, wastage is 
pervasive, owing to insufficient preservation and 
handling facilities, particularly in fishing ports. 
Post-harvest losses may amount to as much as 
40% (Platon and Israel 2001). Municipal ports 
are burdened by a large demand in excess of their 
limited facilities. Ice plants or warehouses are 
small, dilapidated, or absent, particularly in areas 
where power supply is highly irregular. In some 
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cases, there is no choice but to turn over fresh fish 
to those undertaking traditional preservation and 
processing for the domestic market, so as to avoid 
deterioration in the ports. In contrast, regional ports 
(of which there are only seven in the country) are 
underutilized due to inadequate commercial catch 
(Israel and Roque 2000). 
For  the  modern  processing  sub-sector, 
technological development and adoption have 
been quite rapid; this is especially true for large 
and medium-size firms processing tuna, seaweed, 
prawn, and milkfish (Pabuayon, Musa, and Espanto 
1998). The major issue here is market access and 
export requirements, both domestically and abroad, 
with respect to food safety and environmental 
standards. Compliance typically favors large-scale 
operations (Dey et al. 2005b), which already enjoy 
economies of scale in processing, export logistics, 
and marketing, thereby making it difficult for 
small-scale traditional processors to penetrate the 
foreign market. 
On the production side, a persistent problem is 
the prevalence of low yields in aquaculture (Platon 
and Israel 2001). Rising aquaculture output is the 
result of area expansion rather than yield increase; 
technical inefficiencies exist in the production of 
key commodities such as milkfish, tilapia, and 
shrimp (de Jesus, Bondoc, and Almazan 2005). 
This has been attributed mainly to insufficient 
investments in the generation and dissemination of 
appropriate technologies, interacting with resource 
constraints, in terms of access to credit and lack of 
know-how in the use of modern technologies.  
Funding for agricultural research is infinitesimal, 
gauging by the research intensity ratio (percentage 
of research and extension expenditure in agriculture 
GVA), which is among the lowest in the Asian 
region. Within agriculture, the fishery sector is 
even more disadvantaged, receiving less than 4% 
of the total allocation for agriculture and natural 
resources, far lower than its share in agricultural 
GVA (Israel 1999). 
The BFAR has a number of technology centers 
and their staff conduct farm visits and provide 
technical assistance to fish farmers within their 
respective vicinities. Given their limited geographic 
coverage, most of the country’s fish farmers would 
have to be served by municipal extension agents; 
however, few municipalities provide adequate 
support or assign priority to aquaculture extension 
(Yap 1999). 
Credit for fisheries is also severely constrained. 
Banks are reluctant to lend to smallholders due to 
transaction costs, risk, and the absence of assets 
that could be used as collateral (such as land). 
Within agriculture, fisheries suffer from a lopsided 
allocation. The sector accounts for only a minuscule 
portion of loans extended by existing agricultural 
credit programs for small borrowers. The credit and 
guarantee schemes mandated under the Fisheries 
Code have not been funded.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Value creation programs
As discussed in the foregoing, value creation 
programs in fisheries are plagued by the same 
problems as the rest of agriculture, only more 
acutely. The remedy, therefore, parallels the usual 
list of agriculture sector reforms, with resources 
and investments directed to fisheries commensurate 
to its importance within agriculture (for example, 
congruent to its share in agricultural GVA). 
More resources need to be channeled to public 
fisheries research. The additional funds should be 
allocated to the various commodities and research 
problems, following a rigorous, stakeholder-
led priority-setting exercise. Resources should 
be invested to improving the extension system. 
Extension reform should recognize the roles 
played by both local governments and the private 
extension system, as exemplified by after-sales 
service of production inputs such as seed, fertilizer, 
and feed (ADB 2005). National–local extension 
collaboration needs to be oriented towards new 
technologies and locations with high aquaculture 
potential, but for which the private extension system 
is weak or nonexistent. Such pioneering efforts 
should focus on the more environmentally friendly 
forms of aquaculture, rather than the common forms 
such as milkfish and prawn culture. 
For milkfish and other key commodities, the 
role of central hatcheries (operated by the DA) 
should be actively supported. These central stations 
are the hub of the system: the center maintains the 
breeding nucleus, conducts research, and facilitates 
the dissemination of hatchery technologies 
and practices. Ultimately, however, the task of 
disseminating quality seed should be performed 
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by privately-owned satellite hatcheries. This 
“pyramid” system is already being followed, though 
the dissemination mechanism requires further 
strengthening. Research partnerships between 
private and public sectors should be expanded and 
institutional arrangements streamlined (Acosta et al. 
2006). In particular, LGUs should widen their role 
in seed dissemination, by investing in know-how, 
logistics and facilities to promote the access of local 
hatcheries to seeds from the central stations. 
With respect to credit, resource flows should be 
considerably increased to fund fisheries programs. 
Lending through microfinance providers can 
target the poor in fisheries, although livelihood 
projects should not be limited to fisheries; these 
programs can in fact encourage diversification, 
that is, activities outside of capture fisheries. (We 
shall be returning to this point later.) Lending 
through banks would probably target livelihoods 
in fish farming and processing, though options for 
collateral substitution should be carefully explored, 
say, by the expansion of the aquaculture insurance 
program. 
For  the  post-harvest  system,  one  vital 
intervention is upgrading the country’s municipal 
fishing ports. Port development though should fit 
within the context of a larger, integrated coastal 
development plan. In general, a port should not 
be built where it will encourage increased fishing 
pressure on dwindling stocks (Israel and Roque 
2000), nor endanger fragile aquatic habitats (such as 
coral reefs).  There is a clear private sector interest 
in investing in improved port facilities, if the future 
returns (from post-harvest losses avoided) are really 
high. Hence, private sector participation in port 
development should be encouraged; government 
cooperation would be needed to ensure the quality 
and availability of critical infrastructure such as 
power distribution and freshwater supply, and ease 
the regulatory environment for private fishing port 
investments. 
In markets and trade, a few remaining steps 
towards trade liberalization still need to be taken. 
These involve lifting the prohibitions against 
imports and the export of live fish and fry, and 
continued tariff reduction, in transition to setting 
uniform minimal rates. Allowing the entry of cheap 
imported fish (subject to the usual food safety 
standards) would lower costs and maintain a reliable 
flow of raw material for the fish processing and 
canning industry. It would also keep domestic fish 
prices down, benefiting consumers, promoting food 
security, and protecting domestic fish stocks. 
Industry representatives and some NGOs 
are predictably opposed to tariff reduction under 
the current WTO round of negotiations, let alone 
the lifting of import restrictions. One common 
objection is rooted in the fact that developed 
countries offer enormous subsidies to their domestic 
fisheries, thus depressing the prices of fish imports. 
Domestic suppliers are adversely affected. These 
costs, however, need to be weighed against gains to 
consumers, due to cheaper imports, and to improved 




The first set of recommendations is related to 
the public administrative system for fisheries. The 
promotion of grassroots democracy has admittedly 
produced mixed results; however, the dramatic 
improvement in governance in selected localities 
is encouraging. Rather than reversing devolution, 
the policy thrust should be to strengthen devolution 
by filling up the capacity gaps of LGUs. This 
recommendation hinges on a broader initiative to 
address a wide array of LGU constraints, such as 
the inadequacy of the Internal Revenue Allotment, 
the weakness in local resource mobilization, and 
the dearth of trained professionals in the LGU 
hierarchy. The regional and national offices of the 
DA should aim at human resource and institutional 
development at the level of provincial and municipal 
LGUs, rather than supplanting their roles. 
Deeper reexamination of the institutional set-
up is warranted. The organization of government 
functions with respect to aquatic resources 
management needs to be rationalized. The process 
of rationalization should cover not only intra-agency 
issues (such as within the DA), but also interagency 
issues. For instance, the protection of open access 
or common pool resources is primarily the task 
of the DENR. The DA, which has a fundamental 
mandate of assuring food security and promoting 
food production, may not be in the best position 
to administer that protection. This suggests that 
the fishery resource management functions of the 
DA (inclusive of the leasing of public lands for 
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fish farming), be moved to the DENR. Of course, 
productivity and value creation programs (covering 
R & D, technology dissemination, credit, regulation, 
and so forth) should remain within the DA. 
The second set of recommendations relates 
to resource management. At the national level, 
one area for immediate reform is the allocation 
and pricing of fishpond leases. Lease rates (now 
set at low levels) should be drastically increased; 
fishery cooperatives should be actively supported 
and prioritized in receiving leases. Ideally, to help 
secure a constituency for this measure, the revenue 
from the leases should be allocated in part to 
LGUs and community organizations tasked with 
mangrove rehabilitation. 
National government initiative is essential to 
the creation and strengthening of IFARMCs to 
implement ecosystem-based fisheries management. 
Fisheries management should go much farther 
than this, though; the national government should 
actively pursue the imposition of science-based 
catch limits and effort reduction. The catch limits 
should be set and adjusted over time to achieve 
MSY, for major fish stocks. Government can 
initiate this process on a predetermined short-list 
of priority fish stocks throughout the country, and 
gradually expand the list until all major fishing 
areas and stocks are covered. In addition, aside from 
supporting fisheries management, stock assessment 
and monitoring can also assist the commercial 
fishing industry to reduce risks and operating costs 
from venturing into deep-sea fishing. 
Implementation of these management measures 
in municipal waters involves LGU cooperation. 
Coastal LGUs may initiate their greater involvement 
in fisheries management through the formulation of 
a coastal management plan, following the model of 
successful programs (such as the CRMP). The plans 
must include provisions for bringing in municipal 
fishers into the formal sector, where they can be 
regulated. In short, LGUs should de-legitimize 
the prevailing status quo of unlicensed municipal 
fishing. A clear incentive for them to do so would 
be the additional revenue to be generated by the 
license fees. An active information campaign, 
elicitation of support and compliance from the 
affected community, credibility in the stewardship 
of government funds, and simple political will are 
needed to formalize and manage the municipal 
fisheries. 
Community-based management has done fairly 
well in resource rehabilitation, establishment of 
MPAs, and curbing illegal fishing. It is natural 
to recommend expanding such programs. As 
community participation is a key ingredient in 
program success (Pollnack and Pomeroy 2005), 
community-organizing (often by NGOs) should 
be an essential activity. Program sustainability 
for donor-funded projects can be factored into 
project design; for example, donor-funded coastal 
management projects may require that the local 
counterpart be increasing over the course of project 
implementation. 
With the prodding of LGUs and the national 
government, communities may begin to take on a 
task they have hitherto avoided – the reduction of 
fishing effort. This should extend not only to outside 
encroachment, but more importantly, within the 
community itself. Effort reduction at the community 
level would be essential for implementing the 
nationwide imposition of catch limits. 
A crucial ingredient of effort reduction is the 
reliance on incentives, rather than on coercion. 
Resources should be made available to encourage 
some of the fishers to exit permanently. Coordination 
with livelihood diversification programs (especially 
in microfinance) mentioned earlier will be required. 
A particularly inviting target group would be new 
or part-time fishers, who employ fisheries as an 
alternative or fallback livelihood. Since households 
with occupational flexibility may find it easy to 
re-enter, the provision of territorial use rights for a 
community organization is essential to sustaining 
the gains from effort reduction. Conferment of 
these rights should be made conditional on the 
organization consistently enforcing fishery rules 
and catch limits. 
What is envisioned in this recommendation is 
no less than a well-funded, nationwide program 
of coastal management incorporating effort and 
capacity reduction, over both commercial and 
municipal waters, at the national and local scales. 
Clearly, such an effort would require a broad, 
interagency, multi-stakeholder approach, and 
considerable investments up front (especially 
for incentive-based withdrawal from fishing). 
However, the initial investments would make 
perfect economic sense in view of the enormous 
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rents and other use values to be recovered from 
improved management. White and Trinidad (1998) 
offer the example of a typical bay, covering an area 
of 10 km2, restored to its healthy state. Annual 
benefit flows amount to at least 15.2 million pesos 
(as of 1998), whereas annual management costs 
(inclusive of enforcement measures) are only 
around 1.36 million. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has highlighted two striking 
paradoxes of the fisheries sector. The first is 
the paradox of poverty: despite the tremendous 
economic progress of the sector, most fishery-
dependent households remain destitute. This attests 
to both the inequitable distribution of economic 
benefits as well as the massive population pressures 
bearing down on the sector. The second is the 
paradox of productivity: in both capture fisheries 
and aquaculture (particularly in brackish-water 
areas), large increases in production conceal a 
deteriorating resource base, dissipating resource 
rents and threatening the collapse of fish stocks. 
These problems are well-recognized, and 
policies have been formulated in response. Many 
of the reforms have scored noteworthy successes; 
however, it is also acknowledged that much 
more needs to be accomplished. Large gaps in 
implementation remain, and the policy inertia can 
be frustrating. This inertia is due less to ignorance, 
and more to the difficult options that present 
themselves, namely: one, to maintain the status 
quo and its attendant paradoxes; the other, to incur 
and inflict short-term costs, forcing the dislocation 
of some sub-sectors, to win long-term social gains. 
The sharing of these benefits is nonetheless a key to 
forging a consensus for reform among the diverse 
and competing stakeholders. 
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